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INTRODUCTION 
The case for regulating tobacco manufacturers’ prices has been made elsewhere [1-2]. In 
summary, capping prices could generate numerous public health benefits and also be 
financially advantageous to the implementing government.  The appeal of the policy is such 
that there is varying levels of interest in several countries, most notably in the Republic of 
Ireland [3-9]. To that end this article seeks to establish the profitability of the Irish tobacco 
market and thus what additional tax revenue could be raised if such price regulation was 
introduced. 
 
METHOD 
This paper follows the same basic approach as was used previously to examine the 
application of tobacco price regulation in the UK [2].  Data on the major tobacco companies’ 
market share for each tobacco product was obtained from Euromonitor for 2010 and 2011 
[10], and this was used to calculate overall tobacco market shares.  Data on company profits 
was then obtained from the annual reports of the major transnational tobacco companies 
(TTC) and their subsidiary companies operating in Ireland.  Where necessary, estimates of 
profit and revenue were determined using the actual data available.  Calculations were then 
made to estimate by how much current TTC profit would be reduce by the imposition of 
regulation, and thus what money would be available to the government in the form of 
increase tobacco taxation (given the assumption the price to end-consumers would not 
change). The cost of imposing the regulation are allowed for, and the results are presented 
via two scenarios: an optimistic scenario which uses more sympathetic assumptions; and a 
conservative scenario with more cautious assumptions.  
 
RESULTS 
Applying the method to the data available generates table 1 and table 2 which contain 
information on the current profitability of the Irish tobacco market and the scope for 
reducing this to levels currently associated with other European consumer staple 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: 2010 Irish Tobacco Industry actual Profitability and Profits with Regulation* 
 Imperial ***              
(John Player & Sons) 
JTI                       
(Gallaher [Dublin] Ltd) 
BAT                          
(P J Carroll & Co plc) Total** 
Market Share (%) 34.23 46.41 10.76 91.40 
Revenue  €85,139,968 €115,440,477 €35,525,000 €236,105,445 
Profit actually 
made  €35,712,886 €65,308,000 €9,383,000 €110,403,886 
Profit rate 
actually achieved  0.4195 0.5657 0.2641 0.4676 
Profit when 
capped at 20%  of 
actual revenue €17,027,994 €23,088,095 €7,105,000 €47,221,089 
Implied reduction 
in profits from 
2010 level  €18,684,892 €42,219,905 €2,278,000 €63,182,797 
Profit when 
capped at 12% of 
actual revenue  €10,216,796 €13,852,857 €4,263,000 €28,332,653 
Implied reduction 
in profits from 
2010 level €25,496,090 €51,455,143 €5,120,000 €82,071,232 
Source: Author’s calculations using various sources as outlined in the text.  
* JTI’s tobacco duty estimated using information on duty paid by BAT.  Profit figures for Imperial are estimates 
based on their profitability for the EU excluding UK, Germany and Spain, and revenue for Imperial is estimated 
using JTI information adjusted for market share.   
**Total market share doesn’t sum to 100% as the profitability of the companies comprising the remainder of 
the market is assumed to be unaffected by the imposition of price caps 
*** Imperial figures contain Philip Morris International (PMI) brands as they are the distributor in Ireland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: 2011 Irish Tobacco Industry actual Profitability* and Profits with Regulation 
 Imperial  ***             
(John Player & Sons) 
JTI                       
(Gallaher [Dublin] Ltd) 
BAT                          
(P J Carroll & Co plc) Total** 
Market Share (%) 33.34 46.88 10.26 90.48 
Revenue  €79,777,706 €112,184,988 €34,538,000 €226,500,695 
Profit actually 
made  €32,973,449 €62,280,000 €9,003,000 €104,256,449 
Profit rate 
actually achieved 0.4133 0.5552 0.2607 0.4603 
Profit when 
capped at 20%  of 
actual revenue €15,955,541 €22,436,998 €6,907,600 €45,300,139 
Implied reduction 
in profits from 
2010 level  €17,017,908 €39,843,002 €2,095,400 €58,956,310 
Profit when 
capped at 12% of 
actual revenue  €9,573,325 €13,462,199 €4,144,560 €27,180,083 
Implied reduction 
in profits from 
2010 level €23,400,124 €48,817,801 €4,858,440 €77,076,366 
Notes and Sources as per table 1 
 
Table 3 combines these calculations with information on the likely costs of implementing the 
scheme of regulation in order to give estimates of the likely increase in tax revenue the government 
might expect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Calculations of the potential increase in yearly Irish tobacco tax revenues due to price-cap 
regulation 
 2011 2010 
 Optimistic 
Scenario 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Optimistic 
Scenario 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Reduction in profits due to 
regulation  €77,076,366 €58,956,310 €82,071,232 €63,182,797 
Implied reduction in 
corporate taxes at 12.5%  €9,634,546 €7,369,539 €10,258,904 €7,897,850 
Cost of OFSMOKE 
regulator*  €7,000,000 €10,000,000 €7,000,000 €10,000,000 
Potential net increase in 
taxes €60,441,820 €41,586,771 €64,812,328 €45,284,947 
Source: Author’s calculations using information presented in tables 1 and 2. 
* estimated using the expenditure of existing Irish regulators  
 
These results show that the imposition of price caps has the potential to generate between €40m 
and €65m in additional tax revenue each year, a considerable sum in the context of a country like 
Ireland.  These estimates are deliberately conservative in terms of the assumptions taken so are 
likely to be robust and if anything, under-estimate the potential.   
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